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Abstract We introduce the concept of the reverse bullwhip effect (RBWE), which
can be caused by supply disruptions. In the RBWE, order variability increases as
one moves downstream in the supply chain, and therefore the RBWE is the opposite
of the classical bullwhip effect (BWE). We test our conjecture that disruptions cause
the RBWE using both a live ‘‘beer game’’ experiment and a simulation study. In the
beer game, we find that players modify their ordering behavior during disruptions,
and that these modifications cause the RBWE. We confirm this cause of the RBWE
under a broad range of settings using discrete-event simulation. Our results dem-
onstrate that supply uncertainty (in the form of random disruptions) and an over-
weighting of the supply line cause the RBWE. They also confirm previous studies
showing that demand uncertainty and an underweighting of the supply line cause the
BWE. Moreover, our study provides guidance for models of operational disruptions
by incorporating human reactions to disruptions.
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1 Introduction
Hurricane Katrina struck the U.S. Gulf Coast in 2005, disabling most of the oil
drilling and refining capacity in the region, which produces approximately 7% of the
oil consumed in the U.S. (Mouawad 2005). Meanwhile, gasoline consumers reacted
to the potential disruption, resulting in price spikes and long lines for gasoline
(Mouawad and Romero 2005), as well as chaotic gasoline-buying patterns (Gold
et al. 2005).
In the days and weeks following Katrina, therefore, the demand end of the
gasoline supply chain temporarily experienced increased order volatility, while the
supply end experienced less volatility since drillers and refiners were operating full-
tilt at their (newly reduced) capacity. This suggests that demand volatility was
greater than supply volatility—the reverse of the classical bullwhip effect (BWE).
Indeed, we postulate in this paper that a reverse bullwhip effect (RBWE) occurs
during and immediately after supply disruptions. We present evidence for the
RBWE using both a variant of the ‘‘beer game’’ and a simulation study. Moreover,
our study shows that human behavior creates an additional layer of variability to
systems under supply disruptions, suggesting that the modeling of operational
disruptions needs to take human reactions into account. This introduces new
challenges for designing and managing flexible supply chains.
The classical bullwhip effect (BWE) describes the amplification of order
variability as one moves upstream in the supply chain. The BWE was formally
introduced and analyzed by Lee et al. (1997b), and has since drawn extensive
attention from both academia and industry. However, recent evidence suggests that
the BWE does not prevail in general. Baganha and Cohen (1998) study the quantity
of shipments from manufacturers and that of sales from wholesalers and retailers in
the USA from 1978 to 1985. They conclude, by examining the coefficient of
variation, that it is the wholesalers rather than the manufacturers who see the largest
variance of demand (i.e., orders from retailers). This implies that the wholesalers
actually smooth the orders received from the retailers rather than amplifying them.
Moreover, Cachon et al. (2007) perform a detailed empirical study at the industry
level and show that only 47% of industries studied exhibit the BWE, while the
remaining 53% show the reverse, again demonstrating that order variance tends to
be largest in the middle of the supply chain. Similarly, although a number of studies
have confirmed the presence of the BWE in an experimental setting using the beer
game, several of these studies (Croson and Donohue 2003, 2006; Croson et al.
2004; Kaminsky and Simchi-Levi 2000; Wu and Katok 2006) find a substantial
portion of trials in which the opposite effect occurs. Our findings help to explain the
BWE, or lack thereof, identified by these empirical and experimental studies.
In this paper, we show that both the BWE and the RBWE can occur during the
beer game in the presence of supply disruptions. In order to examine and verify the
kind of behaviors that trigger the BWE and RBWE, we perform statistical analyses
on the results of the beer game experiment and use simulation both to validate the
findings of the experiment and to generate additional insight. Previous beer game
studies (e.g., Sterman 1989; Croson and Donohue 2006) have suggested that the
BWE is caused by demand uncertainty and an underweighting of the supply line
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(i.e., partially ignoring on-order inventory when setting order quantities). Our
results confirm these findings. However, we also find that some players put more
emphasis on the supply line in the presence of disruptions. Moreover, we observe
that some players either increase or decrease their order quantities significantly
during supply disruptions. For those players, we find the inverse result to earlier
studies: that overreaction to supply disruptions and overweighting of the supply line
can cause the RBWE. Using the terminology of our bullwhip metaphor in Sect. 1.1,
overreaction to supply shocks serves as an amplifying factor, overweighting of the
supply line serves as a damping factor, and both cause the RBWE.
When the BWE occurs, the demand/order variability increases upstream. In this
case, as Glatzel et al. (2009) advocate, additional flexible resources are needed
upstream, because the supply chain needs to be able to react quickly in the face of
highly volatile demand. However, when the RBWE occurs, it raises a particular
challenge for flexible supply chain design, since in this case the supply and demand
processes are highly interdependent, unlike the independence assumption typically
made in the flexibility literature (e.g. Tomlin and Wang 2005; Lim et al. 2008). If
the flexible design ignores the RBWE, either over- or under-investment may occur,
depending on whether the customers decrease or increase their orders during
disruptions. Our beer game experiment provides a behavioral model to describe
these demand patterns. Moreover, our simulation study helps us understand how the
upstream supply process affects the demand pattern at each stage in the supply
chain. Both studies will be useful in the development of future models for the design
of flexible supply chains.
1.1 The bullwhip metaphor
To illustrate the RBWE, we extend the common metaphor of the supply chain as a
string or whip, with the left-hand side representing upstream supply and the right-
hand side representing downstream demand. Demand variability is represented as a
vibration applied to the right end of the string. It is well known that a base-stock
policy is optimal at each stage of a serial supply chain (and thus the BWE does not
occur) if demands and purchase prices are stationary, upstream supply is infinite
with a fixed lead time, and there is no fixed order cost (Lee et al. 1997b). In this
case, vibrations (demand changes) are transmitted without modification up the
string, as in Fig. 1a. It has been argued (Sterman 1989) that demand spikes act as
shocks applied to the right end of the string, and that these shocks amplify as they
move up the string, causing the BWE (Fig. 1b).
Now suppose that a shock is applied to the left end of the string instead of the
right (Fig. 1c). The wave then initiates upstream and amplifies as it propagates
downstream—the RBWE.
It is also possible for both effects to occur simultaneously. For example, if the left
end of the string acts as a ‘‘fixed point’’ (that is, it is immovable), then vibrations
will tend to first amplify and then dampen as they move up the string (Fig. 1d). Such
a fixed point may represent an upstream supply shortage: The upstream stage
utilizes 100% of its (now reduced) capacity, so it has no variability in its order
quantities. The fixed point may also represent ordering behaviors that tend to
The impact of ordering behavior on order-quantity variability 97
123
dampen, rather than amplify, order variability. Either way, the fixed point ensures
that the vibration (demand) amplitude first amplifies and then dampens as one
moves upstream; that is, the BWE occurs downstream and the RBWE occurs
upstream. We call this the umbrella pattern because a plot of the order variability
stage-by-stage resembles an umbrella. The umbrella pattern may also occur when
exogenous supply and demand shocks both occur (both ends of the string are
perturbed—Fig. 1e). In both cases, order volatility (wave amplitude) is smallest at
the ends of the supply chain (string) and largest in the middle.
The umbrella pattern occurs frequently in our beer game experiment and
simulation study. It also is the shape observed at a macro level by Baganha and
Cohen (1998) and Cachon et al. (2007). We believe our experiments help to explain
the results found by these studies.
The discussion above identifies two types of RBWE. In one type, the upstream end
of the supply chain is fixed, and the volatility tends to reduce as it approaches the
fixed point (Fig. 1d), while in the other, a shock upstream amplifies as it propagates
downstream (Fig. 1c, e). We refer to the former type of RBWE as damping-type and
the latter as amplification-type; we discuss both types in this paper.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Sect. 2, we review the
relevant literature. In Sect. 3, we explain the basic settings for our experiments.
Sections 4 and 5 discuss the results of our beer game and simulation experiments,
respectively. Finally, we summarize our conclusions in Sect. 6.
2 Literature review
The BWE was first described by Forrester (1958), although the term ‘‘bullwhip
effect’’ was coined by managers at Proctor & Gamble and introduced into the
literature by Lee et al. (1997a, b), who suggest four causes of the BWE: demand
forecasting, rationing game, order batching, and price fluctuations. Lee et al.
(1997b) show that all four causes can result from rational, optimizing behaviors on
(a) (b) (c)
(d) (e)
Fig. 1 String vibrations a with no amplification, b with a demand vibration and BWE, c with a supply
shock and RBWE, d with a demand vibration, a fixed point, and umbrella pattern, and e with a demand
vibration, a supply shock, and umbrella pattern. Thick lines above strings plot wave amplitude
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the part of managers. Prior to the work by Lee et al., it was generally thought that
only irrational behaviors caused the BWE.
Sterman (1989) introduces the beer game and observes an order amplification due
to the underweighting of the supply line—that is, players tend to ignore some or all
of their pipeline inventory and instead base their ordering decisions primarily on
their on-hand inventory. The behavioral study by Sterman (1989) and the theoretical
results developed by Lee et al. (1997b) have stimulated numerous theoretical
studies on the causes of the BWE, as well as a number of additional beer game
experiments that attempt to reconcile the theories with actual human behavior, and
to explore other behavioral causes of the BWE. Since this paper is concerned with
behavioral causes for both the BWE and the RBWE, we first review the literature on
the beer game. We refer readers who are interested in theoretical analyses of the
BWE to the survey by Lee et al. (2004).
Kaminsky and Simchi-Levi (2000) find that a reduction in order information delay
and shipment lead-time results in lower total supply chain costs but not in a reduction
of order variability amplification. Chen and Samroengraja (2000) make the mean and
standard deviation of the normally distributed demand known to every player and
find that, though the four operational causes are removed, the BWE still occurs.
Croson and Donohue (2003) observe a decrease in the magnitude of the BWE in their
point-of-sale (POS) treatment group, who know the realized customer demand, when
compared with their control group, who know only the underlying demand
distribution. The primary reason for the decrease is that the participants in the POS
treatment group almost equally utilize the realized customer demand and the order
information from their immediate downstream stage in their ordering decisions.
Steckel et al. (2004) show that POS information can actually increase a team’s costs
when it distracts the participants under certain types of customer demand.
Croson and Donohue (2006) tell the participants the status of the inventory across
the supply chain at any point in time. The magnitude of the BWE decreases compared
with the situation in which participants are not provided with such information,
because upstream stages use downstream inventory information to anticipate and
adjust their orders. Oliva and Gonc¸alves (2007) suggest that participants respond
differently to their own on-hand inventory and backorders due to the difference
between holding and backorder costs and find that participants tend to ignore their own
backorders rather than over-reacting to them and placing panicked orders. Wu and
Katok (2006) show that effective communication along with learning can significantly
diminish the magnitude of BWE. Croson et al. (2004) show that the BWE still persists
even if the demand is constant and known to every player. They attribute this to
‘‘coordination risk’’; that is, players place larger than necessary orders to protect
themselves against the risk that other players will not behave optimally.
Despite its potential to systematically investigate the outcomes generated by
various ordering behaviors, simulation has rarely been used in the BWE literature.
An exception is Chatfield et al. (2004), who use simulation to study the effect of
players’ behaviors in a beer game in which all stages are managed by computer,
rather than by live players. Their order functions are very similar to the base stock
policy studied by Chen et al. (2000). Chatfield et al. find that an increase in the
variance of the stochastic lead time results in greater BWE, while information
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sharing dampens BWE. Furthermore, they provide three forecasting models under
stochastic lead times. The model that forecasts demand and lead-time separately
leads to higher forecast variability and therefore higher order variability than the
other two, one ignoring lead-time uncertainty and the other forecasting lead-time
demand. The BWE reaches its maximum magnitude when demand and lead-time
are estimated separately.
The theoretical studies on the rationing game by Rong et al. (2008) and on the
interactions among capacity, price and demand by Rong et al. (2009) are the first
studies of the RBWE1 in the literature to analyze the operational causes of the
RBWE in the presence of supply uncertainty. Rong et al. (2008) show that the BWE
occurs between retailers and customers and that the RBWE occurs between
suppliers and retailers when retailers compete for scarce supply under a standard
mechanism used by the supplier to allocate the available supply. Rong et al. (2009)
show that when customers react not only to the price itself but also to changes in
price, some pricing strategies implemented by the supplier may lead to the RBWE.
These two papers provide a theoretical development of the RBWE, while the aim of
the present paper is to address the behavioral causes of the RBWE.
Current studies on supply disruptions assume that decision makers are rational
optimizers. Parlar and Berkin (1991), Berk and Arreola-Risa (1994), Parlar and
Perry (1995, 1996), Gupta (1996), Mohebbi (2003), Snyder (2008), and many others
modify classical inventory models to cope with supply disruptions. Tomlin (2006)
examines how the optimal mitigation strategy (backup inventory, supplier
redundancy, or some combination) changes as the characteristics of the disruptions
change. Snyder and Tomlin (2008) take into consideration the benefit of advance
warning of supply disruptions. Babich et al. (2007) study the impact of supplier
default risk on the relationship between one retailer and multiple suppliers. Kim
et al. (2006), Hopp and Liu (2006), Snyder and Shen (2006) and Schmitt et al.
(2008) extend the study of supply uncertainty to multi-echelon supply chains.
Since managers have limited experience in dealing with supply disruptions due to
their low probability of occurrence, it may be difficult to apply the models cited in
the previous paragraph in practice. Moreover, just as Thietart and Forgues (1995)
suggest that the ‘‘butterfly effect’’ (that is, a small variation at one point may cause a
large variation of the whole system) can exist in organizations, so, too, can a small
disruption be amplified by irrational decision makers within a supply chain.
Therefore, studying human behavior under disruptions is important. One of the main
contributions of our paper is to examine people’s behavior when they face supply
disruptions, and the impact of this behavior on order-variability propagation in a
multi-echelon setting.
3 Basic settings
In our beer game experiment and simulation, we study a 4-stage serial supply chain
under periodic review. Stages 1–4 correspond to the retailer, wholesaler, distributor,
1 Ozelkan and Cakanyildirim (2009) use the term ‘‘reverse bullwhip effect’’ to refer to an unrelated
phenomenon involving prices in auctions.
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and manufacturer, respectively. The retailer receives demand from an external
customer. Since our study focuses on the impact of supply shocks, we remove the
demand shocks from beer game and fix the demand to 50 units per period. (The
exception is the simulation study in Sect. 5.1, in which we examine the impact of
supply-line weighting under demand uncertainty only.)
The manufacturer (stage 4) has a production capacity that limits the quantity it
may order in a given period. The production capacity, nt, is also a random variable.
Each time period is classified as either an ‘‘up’’ or a ‘‘down’’ period. During up
periods, nt is larger than the demand observed by the retailer and is smaller during
down periods. This setting is consistent with the supply disruption literature cited in
Sect. 2. The difference is that most papers set nt = 0 during down periods, but we
set nt [ 0 to model the situation in which capacity is reduced but not totally
eliminated during a disruption. See Sects. 3.1 and 5.2 for more details on the supply
process nt.
In each period, each stage i experiences the following sequence of events:
1. The shipment from stage i ? 1 shipped two periods ago arrives at stage i (that
is, the lead-time is 2). If i = 4, stage i ? 1 refers to the external supplier.
2. The order placed by stage i - 1 in the current period arrives at stage i. If i = 1,
stage i - 1 refers to the external customer.
3. Stage i determines its order quantity and places its order to stage i ? 1.
4. The order from stage i - 1 is satisfied using the current on-hand inventory, and
excess demands are backordered. Holding and/or stockout costs are incurred.
To reflect the modern data-processing environment (e.g., EDI) and to maintain
consistency with our assumption that information about disruptions is propagated
instantaneously, we assume (unlike Sterman 1989 and most subsequent papers) no
order information delay, i.e., stage i receives order information in the same period
that the order is placed by stage i - 1.
We examine the presence of the BWE or RBWE at each stage individually. Let
ri be the standard deviation of orders placed by stage i across the time horizon.
When ri [ ri-1, stage i amplifies its order variability; i.e., the bullwhip effect
(BWE) occurs at stage i. If ri \ ri-1, then the reverse bullwhip effect (RBWE)
occurs at stage i instead.
If ri?1 [ri for all i B 3, then the system exhibits pure BWE, and when
ri?1 \ ri for all i B 3, the system exhibits pure RBWE. There are also several other
possible shapes for the pattern of order standard deviations across the supply chain.
For example, when ri?1 [ri for i = 1,2 and ri?1 \ ri for i = 3, the supply chain
exhibits the umbrella pattern; this pattern is natural when the downstream part of the
supply chain is affected primarily by demand uncertainty while the upstream is
affected primarily by the capacity process.
3.1 Experimental design
Our beer game setup is motivated in part by consumer buying patterns for gasoline
following hurricane Katrina. Customers were aware of the supply shock (but not of
the magnitude of its downstream effect), and many of them filled their cars at the
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beginning of the shock in order to avoid future shortage and price fluctuations. In
our beer game experiment, we create capacity shocks during the game to observe
how players behave during supply disruptions. All players know when a capacity
shock is occurring, but only the player in the role of the manufacturer knows its
severity.
Our beer game experiment was conducted using a Microsoft-Excel-based
implementation written by the authors. Our computerized implementation gives
players more information about the status of the system than in the traditional board
version of the game. Figure 2 shows the game’s user interface. Players can easily
acquire information about their own on-hand inventory, backorders, on-order
inventory, and in-transit inventory, as well as backorders at their suppliers.
Each player is randomly assigned to a team and role, and players do not know the
team and role that the other players have been assigned to. No communication is
allowed during the game.
Our implementation automates the information-transfer process: when a player
places an order, it is transmitted electronically to his or her supplier, and when
orders are shipped, the delivery quantity is transmitted downstream electronically.
This reduces transaction errors, speeds the playing of the game, and enforces the no-
communication rule since players do not know who their teammates are.
Following Sterman (1989), we set the holding and backorder cost to $0.50 and
$1.00, respectively, at every stage of the supply chain. In order to focus the study on
the supply uncertainty faced by the whole supply chain, the demand is deterministic.
We fix the demand to 50 units per week and make this known to every player.
The manufacturer has a capacity limitation on his or her order size. Since most of
the literature on supply disruptions (e.g., Parlar and Berkin 1991; Berk and Arreola-
Risa 1994; Parlar and Perry 1995, 1996; Gupta 1996; Mohebbi 2003) uses a Markov
process to model disruptions and recoveries, we also assume that the capacity
fluctuates throughout the game following a two-state discrete-time Markov process.
Fig. 2 Screen shot of beer game
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The ‘‘up’’ state corresponds to full capacity nu and the ‘‘down’’ state corresponds to
disrupted capacity nd. We fix nu = 60 and allow nd to vary randomly according to a
normal distribution with mean 40 and variance 4. The capacity nd is different for
each disruption but the same for every period during a given disruption. The
transition probability from the up state to the down state is pd, and that from the
down state to the up state is pu. The stationary probabilities of being in the up and
down states are therefore pu/(pd ? pu) and pd/(pd ? pu), respectively. To ensure the
stability of the system, we require (nupu ? E(nd)pd)/(pd ? pu) [ 50, the demand per
period. In the experiment, we set pd = 0.2 and pu = 0.3. Hence the average
capacity is 52.
The players were told that the manufacturer occasionally experiences disruptions,
that during a disruption, the capacity decreases to a random value for a random
number of periods, and that after a disruption ends, the capacity returns to its normal
value. Players were not given the actual values of the disruption parameters (pu, pd,
nu, nd). They were told, however, that pu C 50 and that pd is random with mean less
than 50.
Each team faced the same sample path of the disruption process, which was
generated randomly before the experiment began and then repeated to ensure that
fair comparisons could be made from team to team. This sample path includes 17
down periods during the 50-period horizon, occurring during the same periods for
every team. Players were informed that every team would face the same sample
path.
In the real world, when there is a supply disruption, the further away a company
is from the disruption source, the less information it generally has about the
disruption. For example, when a fire occurred at a Philips semiconductor plant in
2000 (Sheffi 2005), the managers at telecom operators’ retail stores are unlikely to
have known how serious the problem was. In order to reflect this situation in our
game, players were notified (via an indicator in the beer game screen) whether a
disruption was in progress, but they did not know how severe the disruption was.
The exception is the manufacturer, who can indirectly determine the capacity in any
period since the program prompts him or her for a new order quantity if the quantity
entered exceeds the capacity.
Our experiment consisted of 92 participants (23 teams of 4 players each) from
Lehigh University, including 84 undergraduate students and 8 graduate students.
Roughly one-third of the participants received a cash incentive for playing the game
(the other two-thirds played the game as part of a course they were enrolled in). For
those receiving cash, the amount of the award was scaled based on the teams’
performance in a manner similar to that described by Croson and Donohue (2003).
Each team played for up to 1 h and 45 min. The introduction lasts 20 min,
followed by a roughly 10-min practice round in which the participants play for five
periods to familiarize themselves with the software environment; the results of this
practice round are discarded. The remaining time is used for the actual experiment.
The maximum number of periods that each team played is 50, and most teams
completed at least 40 periods.
We exclude teams who completed fewer than 30 periods’ worth of game play
since it is reasonable to assume that those teams may not have understood the game
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well enough to play fluently. Based on this criteria, 4 of the 23 teams (teams 9–12)
are omitted from the results below. In addition, team 6 was omitted because its
retailer and wholesaler had mean order quantities of 77.4 and 91.2, respectively,
both of which are more than four standard deviations above the mean order quantity
for all retailers and wholesalers (and significantly more than the demand of 50 per
period). Therefore, the results reported below include a total of 18 teams consisting
of 72 participants.
3.2 Order functions
It is well known that a stationary base-stock policy is optimal in a serial supply
chain if the back-order cost only occurs at the most downstream stage of the supply
chain and all parameters are stationary. Lee and Whang (1999) show that such a
policy is still optimal for decentralized supply chains by introducing specific
performance measures in the decentralized system. However, in most of the beer
game literature, the backorder cost occurs at every stage. We are not aware of any
literature that addresses the structure of the optimal ordering policy for individual-
utility-maximizing players in a serial supply chain in which information is not
shared among supply chain stages and holding and backorder costs are incurred at
every stage. Moreover, although there has been a great deal of research on supply
chain disruptions recently, the study of multi-echelon supply chains under
disruptions is fairly limited (see, e.g., Hopp and Liu 2006). Consequently, the
optimal ordering policy is unknown for centralized serial supply chains with supply
disruptions, nor is the optimal behavior known for individual-utility-maximizing
players under our beer game settings.
In light of these difficulties, Sterman (1989) postulates a model that expresses a
player’s order quantity as a function of several random state variables in order to
analyze whether the players put more focus on their inventory level or their on-order
inventory:
Oit ¼ max 0; O^i1tþ1 þ aibðILit  aibÞ þ bibðIPit  ILit  bibÞ
 
: ð1Þ
We refer to this as the base order function. The state variables used in the
function are as follows:
• ILit: Inventory level (on-hand inventory - backorders) at stage i after event 2
(i.e., after observing its demand but before placing its order) in period t.
• IPit: Inventory position (on-hand inventory ? on-order inventory - backorders)
at stage i after event 2 in period t.
• Oti: Order quantity placed by stage i in event 3 in period t. If i = 0, Oti represents
demand from the external customer.
• O^it : Forecast of order quantity that will be placed by stage i in period t. This
forecast is calculated by stage i ? 1 after event 2 in period t - 1 using
exponential smoothing:
O^i1t ¼ gOi1t1 þ ð1  gÞO^i1t1; ð2Þ
where g is the smoothing factor, 0 B g B 1.
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In (1), ab and bb represent target values for the inventory level (IL) and supply-
line inventory (IP - IL), respectively. The constants ab and bb are adjustment
parameters controlling the change in order quantity when the actual inventory level
and the supply line, respectively, deviate from the desired targets. (The subscript b
stands for ‘‘base’’.) Sterman based this order function on the anchoring and
adjustment method proposed by Tversky and Kahneman (1979). It accounts for
changes in the demand, inventory level, and supply line dynamically, even when the
demand and supply processes are unknown. O^i1tþ1 is treated as the anchor, serving as
a starting point for the order quantity, while the remaining part is the adjustment to
correct the initial decision based on the inventory level and supply line. The order
quantity placed by stage 4 in period t is bounded by its capacity nt in that period.
Therefore the actual order placed by stage 4 in period t is min{Ot
4, nt}.
The relationship between |ab| and |bd| determines how the supply line is weighted:
|ab| [ |bd|, |ab| = |bd|, |ab| \ |bd| results in underweighting, equal weighting, and
overweighting the supply line, respectively.
The base order function does not capture the difference in players’ behavior
during up and down periods. To address this difference, we introduce a new order
function, which we call the disruption order function. This function assumes that
each player knows only that a disruption has occurred but does not know the precise
impact it has on inventories, as is often the case in real-world disruptions. The
disruption order function is as follows. (The subscript d on the coefficients stands
for ‘‘disruption.’’)
Oit ¼ max 0; O^i1tþ1 þ aidðILit  aidÞ þ bidðIPit  ILit  bidÞ þ cidSt
 
; ð3Þ
where St is a public signal to indicate whether there is a supply disruption in the
system; that is, St = 1 if stage 4 is in the down state and 0 otherwise. If cd
i \ 0, then
the player will order less during a disruption (e.g., to reduce potential backorders at
its supplier). If cd
i = 0, the player ignores disruptions, while if cd
i [ 0, then the
player orders more during a disruption (e.g., to protect against possible future
disrupted periods). As in the base order function, the actual order quantity placed by
stage 4 is given by min{Ot
4, nt}.
Our two proposed order functions are used to study (1) whether or not players
pay more attention to the supply line in the presence of disruptions; and (2) whether
or not players order differently during down periods compared with up periods. As
we mentioned above, a mathematical model of rational players is unavailable under
our beer game settings. Therefore, these two order functions should be considered as
tentative models for player behavior. It is an interesting topic of future research to
test the robustness of the results gained from our two order functions versus other
order functions.
4 Beer game results
Our interest is primarily in the presence or absence of the BWE and RBWE during
supply disruptions, rather than over the course of the entire horizon. Prior to
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performing our experiment, we conjectured that the RBWE would occur more often
than the BWE during down periods, but that the BWE may dominate when the SD is
calculated over all periods. This reflects the suggestion that supply disruptions cause
the RBWE and the fact that, taken across all periods, the upstream stage’s order
process is actually more volatile because the capacity changes themselves cause
order variance. Except for Table 1 below, the results reported in the remainder of
Sect. 4 include observations from down periods only.
Our findings may be summarized as follows. In Sect. 4.1, we show that fewer
than half of the players in our beer game experiment exhibited the BWE (that is,
had ri [ ri-1 for a given i) during supply disruptions, while slightly over half
exhibited the RBWE, with the BWE more likely to occur downstream and RBWE
more likely to occur upstream. In Sect. 4.2, we examine the relationship between
the BWE/RBWE and supply-line weighting and show that the players who
underweight [overweight] tend to exhibit the BWE [RBWE]. Moreover, in Sect.
4.3, we show that some players decrease their order quantities during disruptions
since the players are evaluated based on the whole team’s performance. The
decrease in order quantity in response to disruptions and supply-line weighting
type of the players provide an explanation of why some players exhibit the RBWE
while others do not.
Table 1 SD of orders for each player
Team All periods Down periods only
R W D M R W D M
1 0.00 41.76 13.34 15.35 0.00 29.17 16.12 11.10
2 11.22 24.99 14.55 10.25 9.81 28.54 9.76 2.07
3 7.57 21.58 14.38 13.4 7.55 33.27 19.84 6.58
4 4.71 6.99 9.48 9.97 7.38 5.56 8.77 3.11
5 13.02 13.08 19.62 14.49 11.98 11.21 21.65 8.22
7 26.74 14.70 21.85 16.5 23.56 13.36 12.14 5.81
8 11.47 7.56 5.62 9.66 12.95 7.16 5.74 4.79
13 8.04 8.83 9.50 14.87 8.38 5.85 10.66 8.58
14 1.91 2.06 2.21 8.74 2.21 1.99 1.86 2.07
15 10.39 30.31 28.33 18.08 12.56 45.53 28.65 14.28
16 21.83 15.45 8.82 12.52 29.75 18.48 7.77 5.07
17 17.60 39.71 41.26 15.35 18.62 38.95 40.49 9.62
18 7.62 8.23 11.59 14.98 8.17 8.46 12.46 10.90
19 9.41 10.24 18.20 13.23 10.53 8.26 23.98 8.55
20 4.33 6.90 6.94 8.99 3.19 3.78 3.35 2.06
21 6.31 5.56 11.53 10.37 6.04 4.64 5.52 1.21
22 6.70 22.92 17.23 12.30 4.64 23.16 18.78 8.28
23 26.16 15.02 21.06 7.37 22.72 12.90 21.73 5.73
Mean 10.83 16.44 15.31 12.58 11.11 16.68 14.96 6.56
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4.1 The existence of BWE and RBWE
One of the major purposes of our version of the beer game is to test the prevalence
of the BWE in an environment that is different from the standard beer game setup.
Our results suggest that the BWE no longer dominates when supply disruptions are
present. Table 1 contains the SD of the players’ orders for all teams except the five
omitted teams (see Sect. 3.1). Standard deviations are reported both across all the
periods and for down periods only. The column labels R, W, D, and M represent
retailer, wholesaler, distributor, and manufacturer, respectively. In Table 1, if ‘‘’’
appears beside a number in the ‘‘All Periods’’ or ‘‘Down Periods Only’’ column,
then the corresponding player exhibits the RBWE during the whole time horizon or
during down periods, respectively.
Table 1 indicates that 51.4% (37 out of 72) players exhibited RBWE during
down periods, confirming our conjecture that the RBWE at least sometimes occurs
during disruptions. Even when taken across all periods, 30.6% (22 out of 72) players
exhibited RBWE. The middle stages of the supply chain (wholesalers and
distributors) have the greatest order SDs, on average. In the sections below, we
investigate why some players exhibit RBWE while others do not.
The RBWE can occur at wholesalers, distributors and manufacturers, both during
down periods and across all periods. Figure 3 provides a graphical representation of
the order SD of each team during down periods. The dashed line represents the
mean of the order standard deviation over all 18 teams, while the solid lines
represent the individual teams. The general trend in Fig. 3 is an ‘‘umbrella’’ shape,
with demand variability increasing (BWE) downstream but decreasing (RBWE)



















Fig. 3 SD of orders during supply disruptions. Solid lines represent individual teams’ SDs; dashed line
represents mean SD
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We applied Spearman’s rank correlation test (significance level 0.1) to determine
whether the differences in SD between orders and demands (i.e., the differences
among the numbers in Table 1) are statistically significant. The results are
summarized in Table 2, which lists the number of players in each role who
exhibited statistically significant BWE or RBWE. (Details of this and all other
statistical tests can be found in the Appendix.)
Table 2 indicates that, during down periods, 21 out of 72 players (29.4%)
exhibited statistically significant RBWE during down periods and 27 out of 72
(38.2%) exhibited BWE. Across all periods, 13 players (18.1%) exhibit RBWE and
36 players (50.0%) exhibit BWE. Note, however, that since the retailer faces
constant demand, every retailer by definition exhibits BWE (or no BWE/RBWE).
When retailers are excluded from the analysis, 21 out of 54 players (38.9%) exhibit
RBWE during disruptions and 10 players (18.5%) exhibit BWE.
The majority of manufacturers exhibited statistically significant RBWE during
down periods because their orders are bounded by the reduced capacity. On the
other hand, few manufacturers exhibit RBWE when taken across all periods, since
the capacity changes necessarily cause order variability on the part of the
manufacturer. Similarly, retailers automatically exhibit BWE because they face no
demand variability. Taken together, these observations confirm our conjecture that
during disruptions, the BWE occurs downstream and the RBWE upstream. The
picture is less clear in the middle of the supply chain. There is no clear pattern to
whether the BWE or RBWE dominates at wholesalers and distributors during
supply disruptions. In the next two sections, we explore the question of why some
wholesalers and distributors exhibit BWE, some exhibit RBWE, and some exhibit
neither. In addition, we explore the difference between damping-type and
amplification-type RBWEs. In the remainder of Sect. 4, we consider BWE and
RBWE during disrupted periods only.
4.2 BWE/RBWE and supply-line weighting
Sterman (1989) suggests that one of the main causes of the BWE is that people tend
to weight the supply line less than the inventory level when choosing an order
quantity. But when the system faces supply uncertainty rather than demand
uncertainty, does players’ behavior change?
To address the relationship between supply-line weighting and the occurrence of
the BWE/RBWE, we first estimate the parameters of the base order function for
each individual player (except for the manufacturers since their orders are bounded
Table 2 Statistically significant occurrences of BWE and RBWE
Team All periods Down periods only
R W D M R W D M
BWE 17 8 5 6 17 5 5 0
Neither 1 6 7 9 1 9 10 4
RBWE 0 4 6 3 0 4 3 14
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by the capacity). See section ‘‘Base order function regression’’ in the Appendix for
details.
Our main focus is the behavior of wholesaler and distributor since the behavior of
these stages is the least predictable. The results in section ‘‘Base order function
regression’’ show that 23 out of 36 wholesalers and distributors (63.9%)
underweight the supply line, while another 13 overweight it. This result is
significantly different from that of Croson and Donohue (2003, 2006), who find that
98% of 172 players underweight the supply line.
An F-test indicates that 21 out of 36 of wholesalers and distributors (58.3%)
over- or underweight the supply line at a statistically level. Of these, 16 underweight
the supply line and 5 overweight it. We are interested in the relationship between
under-/overweighting and BWE/RBWE during disruptions. Players who overweight
pay more attention to the supply line, and therefore it is reasonable to assume that
these players want the on-order quantity to be stable more than players who
underweight do. Our conjecture is that players who underweight tend to exhibit
BWE, while players who overweight tend to exhibit RBWE. Table 3 lists the
number of wholesalers and distributors falling into each category. Only players who
exhibit statistically significant under-/overweighting and BWE/RBWE are included.
Note that all of the players who underweight the supply line exhibit BWE (or
neither), while all but one of the players who overweight the supply line exhibit
RBWE (or neither).
We conclude that underweighting the supply line is still a major cause of the
BWE, even if supply uncertainty is introduced to the system. On the other hand, the
presence of supply disruptions causes players to think more about the supply line,
hence overweighting it more; those who do are more likely to exhibit RBWE. This
overweighting causes a damping-type RBWE; by overweighting the supply line,
players dampen, rather than amplify, the order variability. In our experiment, we
believe that the emphasis on disruptions happens to be the cause for players to
overweight; however, it is possible that there are also other causes for overweigh-
ting (and consequent damping-type RBWE) that are not related to disruptions.
4.3 BWE/RBWE and reaction to supply disruptions
To evaluate players’ behavior during disruptions, we estimated the parameters for
the disruption order function using the same statistical regression procedure as in
Sects. 4.2 and ‘‘Base order function regression’’, except that we use the disruption
order function in place of the base order function. Again we omit manufacturers
from our regression analysis since their order sizes are constrained by the capacity.
Table 3 Under-/overweighting of supply line and BWE/RBWE for wholesalers and distributors
Weighting type BWE RBWE Neither
Underweight 6 0 10
Overweight 1 4 0
Neither 3 3 –
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The results, given in detail in Table 5 in section ‘‘Disruption order function
regression’’ of the Appendix, indicate that 39 out of 54 players (72.2%) have cd \ 0:
14 retailers, 10 wholesalers, and 15 distributors. This suggests that players are very
likely to decrease their order quantities during supply disruptions to prevent
backorders at their suppliers. This result surprised us at first, but it is intuitive since
the beer game is centralized, and players are evaluated based on the performance of
the whole team. Over-ordering during a disruption does not provide any benefit
(since it does not improve upstream supply) and it hurts the team by incurring
additional stockout penalties. This setting is different from the hurricane Katrina
example, in which customers act in their own best interests.
A significance test on these data indicate that for 14 out of 54 players (25.9%),
the over-ordering during disruptions is statistically significant at a level of
significance of 0.1; these consisted of 6 retailers, 3 wholesalers, and 5 distributors.
Two players (3.7%) exhibit statistically significant under-ordering. For 9 out of the
18 teams (50.0%), one of the two downstream players (retailer or wholesaler) orders
significantly less during disruptions. The downstream reaction in these teams causes
a (negative) demand shock for the middle-stage players (wholesaler and distributor),
who then face both supply and demand shocks. There is no clear pattern as to
whether these middle-stage players exhibit BWE, RBWE, or neither; it depends on
whether these players under- or overweight the supply line (i.e., whether they pay
more attention to their customers or their suppliers).
The data indicate that 8 out of 18 retailers either increase or decrease their order
quantity significantly during disruptions in our beer game experiment. The resulting
demand shock may be amplified by the middle-stage players (if they tend to
underweight the supply line) or may be dampened (if they tend to overweight the
supply line). The interaction between players’ reaction to disruptions and their
partners’ supply-line weighting causes either the BWE or the RBWE; this
relationship deserves further study. When the RBWE does occur for these teams,
it is (at least partly) an amplification-type RBWE, since downstream players cause
abnormally high volatility in reaction to the supply disruption.
5 Simulation experiment
Although the beer game can provide valuable insights into players’ individual
behaviors, it can be difficult to draw general inferences from such an experiment for
two reasons. First, the total cost of the supply chain is highly dependent on the
behavior of the individuals in the chain and on the arrangement of players in the
team. Second, from previous studies (Croson and Donohue 2006; Sterman 1989),
we know that individuals behave quite differently from each other, and the
behaviors of the participants in a given team may interact strongly. The same player,
if assigned to different groups, may even behave differently due to the effect of
other players. For example, a player may be relatively rational if her downstream
partner can control his order variability, but her behavior may be more chaotic if her
partner’s orders are volatile and unpredictable.
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Another drawback of the beer game experiment is the time limit. To achieve
some sort of stable behavior, the participants need to learn the order patterns of their
customer and supplier, and this may take a long time. This suggests that the
estimated parameters in the order function vary over time at the beginning of the
horizon. However, the time limitation prevents the beer game from being played
long enough to achieve stability.
In addition, there are differences between the incentives in the beer game and
those in a real business setting. In the beer game, the total cost of the supply chain is
the performance measure, while real businesses care about their own profit, not
(directly) that of their partners. This may cause different values of the parameters in
the order function, e.g., the customers in the hurricane Katrina example may have
positive cd instead of negative ones. Finally, due to time and cost considerations, it
is possible to test only a limited set of assumptions in the beer game (e.g., one type
of disruption process, etc.).
These drawbacks can be addressed using a simulation study, in which all stages
are operated by a computer rather than by humans, following pre-defined ordering
rules. Such a study makes it convenient to perform what-if analyses regarding
different ordering behaviors, disruption processes, and so on. It is also trivial to run
the system long enough to achieve an approximately steady state. Thus, our
simulation study complements our beer game experiment and may be viewed as
serving a sensitivity analysis role.
To perform our study, we used the freeware software (Snyder 2006), which
simulates multi-echelon supply chains with stochastic supply and/or demand. Each
stage can have its own ordering function, following any of several types of
inventory policies, including base stock, (r, Q), (s, S), and various anchoring and
adjustment order functions. More information about the supply chain assumptions
made by the simulation can be found in the documentation that accompanies the
software (Snyder 2006).
Our goal is to simulate the system with different parameter values to determine
the impact of various behaviors on ordering patterns across the whole system. For
each setting of the parameters, we simulated the system for 10 trials, each consisting
of 1,000 periods with a 100-period warm-up interval.
In Sect. 5.1, we establish the relationship between the BWE/RBWE and supply-
line weighting type under demand uncertainty only in order to validate our
simulation model against previous studies. Then, in Sect. 5.2, we investigate the
impact of supply-line weighting type and disruption reaction on the BWE/RBWE.
Finally, in Sect. 5.3, we consider the impact of different capacity processes on the
BWE/RBWE.
5.1 Effect of supply-line weighting under demand uncertainty only
Previous experimental studies, such as Sterman (1989), show through regression
analysis that underweighting the supply line is a major factor in causing the BWE.
To evaluate the relationship between the BWE/RBWE and supply-line weighting
type, as well as the magnitude of the BWE/RBWE under demand uncertainty only,
we use a 2-stage model consisting of a retailer and a wholesaler. The demand
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follows a normal distribution with mean 50 and standard deviation 10. There is no
capacity limit at the wholesaler. The exponential smoothing factor g is fixed to 0
based on the assumption that the customer demand process is known to both stages.
We set a = 10 and b = 100. Using the base order function (Sect. 4.2), we vary ab
and bb from 0.1 to 0.9 in increments of 0.1, respectively.
Figure 4 shows a contour plot of the BWE/RBWE at the wholesaler (i.e., the
difference in order standard deviations between the retailer and wholesaler) under
different weights on the inventory level and supply line. The x- and y-axes plot ab
and bb. It is evident from Fig. 4 that there is a break roughly along the line
|ab| = |bb|, that is, equal weighting between on hand inventory and the supply line.
When |ab| is sufficiently larger than |bb| (underweighting the supply line), the
retailer’s order SD is smaller than the wholesaler’s; that is, the BWE occurs. The
less weight is placed on the supply line, the greater the magnitude of the BWE is.
On the other hand, when |ab| \ |bb| (overweighting the supply line), the system
exhibits RBWE. However, the magnitude of the RBWE appears to be insensitive to
the weight placed on the supply line.
Our simulation confirms previous experimental studies on the relationship
between the BWE and underweighting the supply line and suggests further that the
RBWE occurs when players overweight the supply line. The magnitude of the
RBWE appears to be smaller than that of the BWE and less sensitive to the degree
of supply-line weighting. On the other hand, in a recent survey by Muthukrishnan
and Shulman (2006), 65% of the 2,990 responding executives believe that supply
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Fig. 4 Impact of weights on BWE/RBWE
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heavily on the supply line when making inventory decisions. This can diminish the
magnitude of the BWE or even create the RBWE. As shown in our beer game
experiment, when supply disruptions are a major factor, some players may change
their behavior and put more emphasis on the supply line, resulting in the RBWE.
5.2 Impact of reaction to supply disruptions
To examine the impact of supply disruptions in a serial supply chain, we use a
4-stage model, as in the beer game setting. The simulation study shows that the
reaction to supply disruptions downstream serves as a trigger of order volatility. The
relative weights between on-hand and supply-line inventory of each player largely
determine the pattern of order standard deviations throughout the supply chain.
We use the disruption order function (Sect. 3.2) to model players’ reaction to
disruptions. To isolate the effect of downstream volatility, and because the results in
Sect. 4.3 indicate that downstream players are most likely to react to supply
disruptions, we set cd = 0 at stage 1 only; that is, only stage 1 changes its order
quantity in response to disruptions. For the underweighting case, we set ad = -0.2
and bd = -0.1. For the overweighting case, we set ad = -0.1 and bd = -0.2. This
choice of a and b makes the underweighting and overweighting significant while
keeping their values within the typical ranges observed in Table 5. The parameters
g, ad, and bd are set the same as their counterparts in Sect. 5.1.
The capacity distribution is almost the same as in the beer game, except the
down-state capacity is fixed rather than random. The order placed by stage 4 is
bounded above by nd or nu (depending on the state). We assume nd \ 50 \ nu.
We investigate three cases, representing two extremes and a more realistic hybrid
scenario: (1) all stages overweight the supply line (OW); (2) all stages underweight
the supply line (UW); (3) stages 3 and 4 overweight the supply line and stages 1 and
2 underweight the supply line (OUW). In case OW, all players follow traditional
beer game behaviors. In case UW, players are aware of the supply disruptions and
put more weight on the supply line. Case OUW represents the case in which players
closer to the supply pay more attention to the supply line while players closer to the
demand pay more attention to their own inventory.
We vary cd to model stage 1’s reaction to disruptions. The order SD of each stage
during disruptions is shown in Fig. 5. We fix nu = 60, nd = 40 and pd = 0.1 and
vary pu among 0.2, 0.5 and 0.8 to represent slow, medium, and quick recovery,
respectively. Stage 4’s order SD during disruptions is zero or close to zero because
of the tight capacity.
From Fig. 5, when cd = 0, there is still some order variability at all stages; i.e.,
the supply disruption transfers downstream. That is because the supply disruption
affects the downstream stages through changes in its inventory level and supply
line. But if the retailer does not react to disruptions (much), then the order
variability is limited, especially when the disruptions are not severe.
When cd is large enough, the retailer generates sufficient demand uncertainty for
his or her upstream partner. Underweighting the supply line then magnifies the order
shock such that the BWE appears from stage 1 to stage 3 consistently in case UW
and from stage 1 to stage 2 consistently in case OUW. At the same time,
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overweighting the supply line can effectively reduce the order shock, which causes
the RBWE for the wholesaler and distributor in case OW and the distributor in cases
OUW. However, the sign of cd is not an important factor in determining the order
SD since the order SDs are quite symmetric in Fig. 5. Note also that, as pu increases,
the order SDs decrease, reflecting the improved reliability of the system.
Figure 6 depicts the order SD for each case in Fig. 5, taken at cd = -10. It
represents the general pattern of order SDs that can occur in the supply chain. The
beer game experiment indicates that people may respond to supply disruptions
differently. This is also shown in Fig. 6, where the order standard deviation can
exhibit various types of curves. In reality, if the manufacturer and the retailer have
more control over the supply chain—for example, the manufacturer produces a
popular brand and/or the retailer has the advantage of a strong sales channel, then



































































































































































Fig. 5 Effect of stage 1’s reaction to supply disruptions. a OW pu = 0.2, b UW pu = 0.2, c OUW
pu = 0.2, d OW pu = 0.5, e UW pu = 0.5, f OUW pu = 0.5, g OW pu = 0.8, h UW pu = 0.8, i OUW
pu = 0.8







Fig. 6 Simulated order SD when cd = -10
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companies close to the manufacturer may weigh the supply line more while
companies close to the retailer may weigh the inventory level more. Consequently,
the chance of having an ‘‘umbrella’’ pattern of order SDs is high.
We conclude that, for sufficiently large |cd|, the retailer generates significant
demand uncertainty for the wholesaler. Interestingly, the magnitude of the reaction
matters more than the direction, as evidenced by the approximate symmetry with
respect to the y-axis in Fig. 5. Moreover, the players’ weighting types determines
the ordering of SDs, and therefore the presence of the BWE, RBWE, or umbrella
pattern.
Players’ reactions to supply disruptions can be considered as a magnifying force,
created by the supply disruption and propagating downstream in the form of an
amplification-type RBWE. At the same time, overweighting the supply line can be
considered as a damping force that decreases vibrations that are propagating
upstream, creating a damping-type RBWE.
5.3 Impact of disruption process
In the base and disruption order functions, it is the variability in the inventory level
and supply line that creates order fluctuations during supply disruptions. The
inventory level and supply line are, in turn, highly dependent on the capacity
process. However, we find that the order SD does not increase monotonically with
respect to the failure probability. It usually reaches its highest point when the failure
probability is roughly equal to 0.5. In contrast, the order SD decreases monoton-
ically with respect to the recovery probability. Moreover, we find that the recovery
probability has more impact on the order SD than the failure probability does.
We examine the impact of the capacity process on order variability in Fig. 7. We
set cd = -10. In parts a–c, we set pu = 0.9 and vary pd, while in parts d–f, we set
pd = 0.1 and vary pu.
When all stages overweight the supply line (parts a and d), the RBWE is evident
between stages 1 and 4 for all values of pd and pu, though for some values, r3 [ r2.











































































































Fig. 7 Effect of the frequency of supply disruptions. a OW pu = 0.9, b UW pu = 0.9, c OUW pu = 0.9,
d OW pd = 0.1, e UW pd = 0.1, f OUW pd = 0.1
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When all players underweight (parts b and e), the BWE prevails strongly for stages
1–3, though the SD is small at stage 4 due to the tight capacity. Finally, when
upstream players overweight and downstream players underweight (parts c and f),
the umbrella pattern is apparent, with the smallest order SDs at stages 1 and 4 and
the largest at stages 2 and 3.
As the frequency of supply disruptions increases in parts a–c, the order SD at
each stage does not react monotonically. This can be explained as follows. The
number of up periods follows a geometric distribution with parameter pd. The mean
and variance of the number of up periods decrease as the failure probability
increases. The inventory level and supply line approach a stationary level when the
number of up periods increases. If the failure probability is small, the variance of the
number of up periods is large but the inventory and supply line become stable at the
end of the last up period due to a high mean number of up periods. If the failure
probability is large, the change in the inventory level and supply line is quick
because the mean number of up periods is small, but the variance of the number of
up periods is low. Therefore, the greatest fluctuation in the inventory and supply line
at the beginning of the disruption is achieved when pd & 0.5. Put another way, the
system is relatively predictable if pd is either large or small, but is less predictable
otherwise. Therefore, the order standard deviation reaches its highest point when the
failure probability is in the medium range.
As the recovery speed increases in parts d–f, the order SDs at each stage decrease
monotonically, because when the number of down periods increases, the inventory
level decreases. This makes the order quantity increase by the number of recovery
periods, which expands the range of order quantities. Therefore, the order SD
decreases with the recovery probability.
In Fig. 8, we set pu = pd; that is, the failure and recovery probabilities are the
same, and therefore so are the stationary probabilities of being up and down. We set
cd = -10, and nu and nd to 65 and 45 to ensure that the overall capacity is sufficient
to meet the demand. As pu and pd increase, disruptions become more frequent but
shorter. As this happens, Fig. 8 is closer to parts d–f than it is to parts a–c in Fig. 7.
This indicates that the recovery process dominates the disruption process in terms of
order SD. This can also be verified from the magnitude of Fig. 7, where the
maximum value of the y-axis in parts a–c is half of that in parts d–f.
We conclude that, just as in the beer game, players’ supply-line weighting type
has a significant impact on whether the BWE, RBWE, or umbrella pattern is





























































Fig. 8 Effect of frequency of supply disruptions with equal up and down probabilities. a OW, b UW, c
OUW
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present. Moreover, the order SDs are not monotonic with respect to pd but decrease
monotonically with pu. The recovery process, therefore, seems to have a stronger
impact on order SDs than the disruption process.
6 Conclusion
Managers face uncertainty not only from the demand side but also from the supply
side. The past several years have seen a range of high-profile disruptions or near-
disruptions, including Y2K, September 11th, SARS, the Indian Ocean tsunami, and
hurricane Katrina. These low-probability, high-impact events have a tremendous
impact on the supply chain, as do smaller, less newsworthy disruptions that happen
on a regular basis. In this paper, we studied potential forms of ordering behavior
during disruptions by introducing supply uncertainty into the beer game and a
simulation model.
From our beer game experiment and simulation studies, we conclude that the
BWE is not a ubiquitous phenomenon and suggest that a reverse phenomenon, the
RBWE, often occurs because of supply disruptions. We have identified two
independent ways to generate the RBWE: overweighting of the supply line and
overreacting to capacity shocks. The first causes the RBWE by smoothing the order
pattern upstream (damping-type RBWE). The second propagates supply disruptions
downstream in the form of increased order volatility (amplification-type RBWE).
Both causes provide some explanation as to why recent empirical studies have
concluded that the BWE is not as prevalent as previously thought (Baganha and
Cohen 1998; Cachon et al. 2007).
Behavioral supply chain research addresses the question of how people behave in
various settings and the effect of that behavior on the supply chain as a whole. Our
descriptive models examine the relationship between individual behaviors and order
variability. We believe they can serve as a foundation for studies involving
questions of designing and managing flexible supply chains. Possible research
questions might include:
• When supply disruptions occur, how should a manager of site(s) in the middle of
the supply chain manage flexibility in the presence of both upstream shortages
and demand changes due to human reactions?
• As the BWE and RBWE indicate that both demand and supply uncertainty may
be amplified, where should flexibility be added to the supply chain? Should it be
close to the sources of uncertainty or near the locations with the most direct
impact on supply chain performance?
• The current literature on flexibility (see the recent reviews by Buzacott and
Mandelbaum 2009, Chou et al. 2009 in this issue of the journal) provides many
means to plan and manage flexible resources. Will increased flexibility reduce or
increase the BWE and RBWE? Would chaining or other well studied flexible
structures still be preferable if BWE/RBWE is a major concern of the decision
maker? If not, how should the principles and guidelines on flexible structure
design be changed?
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• How can contracts be designed between two parties in a supply chain to share
the cost and benefit of flexibility to cope with both demand and supply
uncertainty?
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Appendix
Test of significance of difference in order SDs
To test whether the differences in SD between orders and demands (i.e., the
differences among the numbers in Table 1) are statistically significant, we consider
the following null hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1 There is no amplification of either order or demand variability. That
is, the order SD is equal to the demand SD.
Since each player’s orders and demands are dependent, and their distributions are
unknown, a standard F-test cannot be performed. Instead, we transform Hypothesis
1 to test whether the correlation coefficient of Oi - Oi-1 and Oi - Oi-1 is zero.
To test this correlation, we applied Spearman’s rank correlation test using a level
of significance of 0.1. The results are shown in Table 4, in which 0 indicates that the
player does not show a significant difference between order and demand SDs (no
BWE or RBWE), 1 indicates that the order SD is statistically larger than the demand
SD (BWE), and -1 indicates the reverse (RBWE). The final three rows indicate the
number of players exhibiting each type of behavior.
Base order function regression
We wish to estimate the parameters of the base order function for each player
(except for the manufacturers since their orders are bounded by the capacity). A
simple least-squares fit cannot be applied in this case, because such a procedure
would have infinitely many optimal values for the targets for IL (ab
i ) and IP - IL
(bb






i can be predicted. Therefore, we
follow the statistical procedure used in previous beer game studies (e.g., Croson and
Donohue 2003, 2006; Oliva and Gonc¸alves 2007) to calibrate the order quantity
function to observed data by treating -ab
t ab - bb
i bb as a single constant. Since all
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players know that the external customer demand is fixed to 50, demand forecasting
is not required, so we set the smoothing factor g = 0.
The results of the regression are shown in the first set of columns in Table 5. (The
second set of columns will be used in Sect. 4.3.) The columns labeled a^b and b^b
give the parameter estimates. The column labeled Weighting Type indicates the
supply-line weighting for each player: U represents underweighting (|ab| [ |bd|),
while O indicates overweighting (|ab| \ |bd|). Note that regression is not applicable
for one player, R1, who ordered exactly 50 units every week.
To test the statistical significance of the observations in Table 5, we formulate
Hypothesis 2:
Hypothesis 2 Wholesalers and distributors treat the inventory level the same as
the supply line. That is ab = bb.
Table 6 shows the F-test results for Hypothesis 2 using a 0.1 level of
significance. The results for retailers are included for comparison. In the table, U
indicates whether the weight placed on the inventory level is significantly higher
Table 4 Results of Spearman’s rank correlation test for Hypothesis 1
Team All periods Down periods only
R W D M R W D M
1 0 1 -1 1 0 1 0 -1
2 1 1 -1 0 1 1 -1 -1
3 1 1 -1 0 1 1 -1 -1
4 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 -1
5 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 -1
7 1 -1 1 0 1 -1 0 -1
8 1 -1 -1 1 1 -1 0 0
13 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0
14 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0
15 1 1 0 -1 1 0 0 -1
16 1 -1 -1 1 1 -1 -1 -1
17 1 1 0 -1 1 1 0 -1
18 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 -1
19 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 -1
20 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0
21 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 -1
22 1 1 -1 0 1 1 0 -1
23 1 -1 0 -1 1 -1 0 -1
BWE 17 8 5 6 17 5 5 0
Neither 1 6 7 9 1 9 10 4
RBWE 0 4 6 3 0 4 3 14
1 = BWE, -1 = RBWE, 0 = neither
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Table 5 Regression results for base and disruption order functions
Base Disruption
a^b b^b Weighting type a^d b^d c^d Reaction type
R1 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
W1 -0.19 -0.44 O -0.19 -0.41 -47.24 D
D1 -0.13 -0.01 U -0.12 -0.01 -0.48 D
R2 -0.19 0.07 U -0.19 0.06 -1.13 D
W2 -0.43 -0.01 U -0.43 -0.02 0.76 I
D2 -0.07 -0.10 O -0.07 -0.10 3.22 I
R3 -0.66 -0.55 U -0.65 -0.54 -4.36 D
W3 -0.15 -0.23 O -0.17 -0.26 10.94 I
D3 -0.47 -0.64 O -0.48 -0.65 -5.29 D
R4 -0.50 -0.12 U -0.51 -0.12 -0.87 D
W4 -0.57 -0.41 U -0.57 -0.41 -3.41 D
D4 -0.48 -0.14 U -0.47 -0.14 -2.39 D
R5 -0.12 -0.06 U -0.14 -0.07 -9.77 D
W5 -0.04 -0.07 O -0.04 -0.08 0.71 I
D5 -0.37 0.08 U -0.37 0.08 -4.04 D
R7 0.02 -0.04 O 0.02 -0.03 -21.72 D
W7 -0.11 0.15 O -0.10 0.17 -6.57 D
D7 -0.31 -0.16 U -0.32 -0.17 -15.95 D
R8 -0.10 -0.10 O -0.10 -0.09 -11.57 D
W8 0.02 -0.19 O 0.02 -0.14 -3.32 D
D8 -0.14 -0.13 U -0.09 -0.09 -5.43 D
R13 0.01 -0.02 O -0.02 -0.06 -8.34 D
W13 -0.21 -0.11 U -0.16 -0.08 -7.41 D
D13 -0.01 -0.02 O -0.01 -0.04 -4.53 D
R14 -0.11 0.07 U -0.11 0.08 -0.23 D
W14 -0.11 -0.13 O -0.11 -0.15 -1.67 D
D14 -0.38 -0.39 O -0.36 -0.37 -0.48 D
R15 -0.26 -0.04 U -0.27 -0.05 -1.37 D
W15 -0.57 -0.25 U -0.60 -0.27 -6.54 D
D15 -0.30 -0.06 U -0.30 -0.06 -3.60 D
R16 0.15 0.00 U 0.16 0.00 4.54 I
W16 -0.16 -0.27 O -0.16 -0.27 4.13 I
D16 -0.09 -0.06 U -0.09 -0.06 1.64 I
R17 -0.39 -0.04 U -0.38 -0.04 -0.56 D
W17 -0.35 -0.12 U -0.36 -0.13 4.48 I
D17 -0.63 -0.65 O -0.63 -0.65 -4.02 D
R18 -1.04 -0.81 U -0.95 -0.73 -5.89 D
W18 -0.32 -0.03 U -0.31 -0.03 -1.55 D
D18 -0.40 -0.16 U -0.39 -0.16 -2.26 D
R19 0.13 -0.05 U 0.12 -0.05 2.10 I




a^b b^b Weighting type a^d b^d c^d Reaction type
W19 -0.34 -0.28 U -0.34 -0.29 4.39 I
D19 -0.11 -0.22 O -0.11 -0.20 -5.68 D
R20 -0.72 -0.34 U -0.74 -0.32 -2.58 D
W20 -1.08 -0.72 U -1.10 -0.75 1.69 I
D20 -0.19 -0.14 U -0.21 -0.14 -2.70 D
R21 -0.22 -0.32 O -0.22 -0.31 0.71 I
W21 -0.36 -0.04 U -0.34 -0.07 -2.09 D
D21 -0.44 -0.20 U -0.31 -0.15 -11.29 D
R22 -0.17 0.09 U -0.16 0.10 -1.15 D
W22 -0.72 -0.21 U -0.73 -0.20 -1.60 D
D22 -0.44 -0.33 U -0.44 -0.33 0.81 I
R23 0.02 -0.13 O 0.02 -0.13 -7.37 D
W23 0.09 0.03 U 0.09 0.03 1.33 I
D23 -0.14 -0.03 U -0.15 -0.03 -6.43 D
Mean -0.28 -0.17 -0.28 -0.17 -3.61
O = overweighting, U = underweighting, D = decrease quantity during disruptions, I = increase
quantity during disruptions
Table 6 Results of hypothesis
test for equal weight of inventory
level and supply line
Note: * and  indicate that the





Team R W D
1 N/A O* U
2 U U* –
3 U –* O
4 U U U*
5 U – U*
7 – O –
8 – O –
U3 – U –*
U4 U – –
U5 – – U
U6 – O –
U7 U U* –
U8 – U U*
U9 U U –*
2– U U –
2U – U U
22 U U* U
23 O – –
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than that placed on the supply line (underweighting), while O indicates
overweighting. A – indicates that there is no significant difference in weight
between the inventory level and the supply line. An asterisk (*) indicates that the
player exhibits a statistically significant degree of BWE in Table 4, while a dagger 
indicates RBWE.
Disruption order function regression
To evaluate players’ reaction to disruptions, we estimated the parameters for the
disruption order function using the same statistical regression procedure as in Sects.
4.2 and ‘‘Base order function regression’’, except that we use the disruption order
function in place of the base order function.
The results are displayed in the second set of columns in Table 5. The column
labeled Reaction Type contains I if the player increases his or her order size during
disruptions (cd [ 0) and D if the player decreases his or her order size (cd \ 0).
To test whether this over- or under-ordering is statistically significant, we use the
following null hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3 Players ignore the supply disruption signal. That is, cd = 0, and the
disruption order function degenerates to the base order function.
The results, using a level of significance of 0.1, are shown in Table 7. In this
table, – indicates a player who does not behave statistically differently during up
and down periods, while I [D] means that during disruptions the player orders
significantly more [less] than he or she does in normal periods.
Table 7 Results of hypothesis
test for reaction to disruptions
Note: * and  indicate that the
player exhibits BWE or RBWE,
respectively
D = decrease quantity during
disruptions, I = increase quantity
during disruptions, – = neither
Team R W D
1 N/A D* –
2 – –* –
3 D –* –
4 – D –*
5 D – –*
7 D – D
8 D – D
13 D – –*
14 D – –
15 – – –
16 – – –
17 – –* D
18 – – –*
19 I – D*
20 I – –
21 – D –
22 – –* –
23 – – D
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